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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
duct alone will simply deter police departments from making rules of
conduct at all, because of their fear of imposing unnecessary civil lia-
bility."'3 6 These organizations believe that internal regulations are vi-
tally important to controlling police misuse of force.37
The Peterson majority recognized a need to protect the rights of sus-
pects and control the discretion of the police38 and apparently felt that
the threat of civil liabilty for violations of department firearms rules
would effectively deter police misconduct. 9 Police departments
throughout the nation will be looking at this decision and its implica-
tions. We should know soon whether this decision acts as a deterrent
or merely discourages internal rule-making.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-STATE CONSTITU-
TION MAY GUARANTEE BROADER RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND Ex-
PRESSION THAN THOSE RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION. Robins Y. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899,
592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 419 (1979)
(No. 79-289). Owners of a private shopping center denied appellants,
who were soliciting signatures on a petition concerning foreign policy,
access to the center.' Appellants sought to enjoin enforcement of the
36. Id. at 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.7.
37. Accord, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.06, at 150 (3d ed. 1972); Caplan, The
Casefor Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 500 (1971); Safer,
Dead Weapons In The Hands of Police Officers, On Dut
, 
and Off Duty, 49 J. URB. L. 565, 572
(1971).
38. 24 Cal. 3d at 244.46 & n.7, 594 P.2d at 480-81 & n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64 & n.7. In its
zeal to protect these rights, the supreme court decided this case on an issue that plaintiff had, as
the dissent notes, abandoned on appeal. Plaintiff accepted the trial court's ruling that the doctrine
of negligence "per se" was not invoked. Id. at 249, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (Rich-
ardson, J., dissenting).
39. In imposing liability the court usurped the function of the legislature.
The formulation of a policy governing use of deadly force by police officers is a heavy
responsibility involving the delicate balancing of different interests: the protection of
society from criminals, the protection of police officers' safety, and the preservation of all
human life if possible. This delicate judgment is best exercised by the appropriate legis-
lative and executive officers.
Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 371, 132 Cal. Rptr.
348, 351-52 (1976).
1. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902-03, 592 P. 2d 341, 342, 152
Cal. Rptr. 854, 855, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 419 (1979) (No. 79-289).
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shopping center's prohibition of all publicly expressive behavior inside
the center.2 Appellants claimed that the California constitution3 guar-
antees the right to petition at such facilities, and asked the court to
overrule Diamond v. Bland,4 which refused to recognize this right.5
The Superior Court denied the injunction; the California Supreme
Court reversed and held. The California constitution protects the right
to reasonably' petition in privately owned shopping centers.7
The right to free speech and expression on another person's private
property is a frequent subject of litigation.8 Litigants have traditionally
asserted free speech claims under the federal constitution's guarantees, 9
but restrictions on federal rights to free speech on private property ap-
2. 23 Cal. 3d at 902-03, 592 P.2d at 342, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
3. CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, §§ 2-3. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press." Id. § 2. "The people have the right to instruct their represent-
atives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the com-
mon good." Id. § 3.
4. Diamond v. Bland (Diamond II). 11 Cal. 3d 331, 334-35, 521 P.2d 460, 463, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). In Diamond I the California Supreme Court
reversed its holding in Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970),
ceri. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), and held that private property interests of the shopping center
outweighed claimants' first amendment rights to petition. II Cal. 3d at 334-35, 521 P.2d at 463,
113 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
5. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
6. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. "By no means do we imply that those
who wish to disseminate ideas have free rein." Id.
7. Id.
8. Individuals asserting claims against owners of private property have met with varying
degrees of success. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (although first amendment
does not guarantee right to picket store in private shopping center, that right may be extended by
statute); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (antiwar protestors denied access to shopping
center for purpose of distributing handbills); Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (union picketing of store in private shopping center held constitutionally
protected); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (successful assertion of right to distribute reli-
gious material in company-owned town); In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P. 2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1969) (right .to free speech extended to privately owned sidewalk adjacent to store); In re
Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (antiwar protestors granted access
to privately owned railway station to distribute handbills); Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v.
Bakery & Confectionary Workers' Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964)
(union has right to picket store in private shopping center); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping
Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970) (petitioning allowed on privately owned side-
walk when property is functionally equivalent to sidewalk in public business district).
9. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
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parently' ° compelled appellants in Robins to allege deprivation of
state-guaranteed rights."I
The first 2 and the fourteenth 3 amendments to the United States
Constitution guarantee freedom of speech and expression. The first
amendment prohibits Congress from restricting the right to "petition
government for a redress of grievances."'14 The fourteenth amendment
extends this prohibition to deprivations resulting from a "state ac-
tion."' 5 Courts initially held the fourteenth amendment inapplicable to
10. The restrictions are the most obvious reason for appellants' decision to allege deprivation
cf state-guaranteed rights. See notes I1, 17-18 infra.
II. 23 Cal. 3d at 903, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The state action requirement of
the fourteenth amendment compelled appellants to assert their claims under the state, rather than
the federal, constitution. "It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subiect matter of the amendment." The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). For further discussion of the state action requirement, see note 17 infra.
12. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
l?. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, cl. 2.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875). "The
very idea of government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances."
Id.
15. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1962)
(fourteenth amendment permits freedom to petition for redress of grievances); DeJonge v. Ore-
gon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1936) (rights to peaceably assemble and to petition for redress of griev-
ances are fundamental principles of liberty and justice embodied in fourteenth amendment). The
Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment precludes state invasion of all first
amendment rights. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964) (al-
though first amendment was originally only a limit on federal government, adoption of fourteenth
an'endment extended application to states); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637-39 (1943) (fourteenth amendment requires states to perform functions within constraints
of Bill of Rights); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) ("[sjpecific pledges of particu-
lar amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
througb the Fourteenth Amendment become valid as against the states"); Gitlow ". New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and the press--which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment from impairment by the States."); cases cited note 16 infra; Note, Sate
.4crion: Theoriesfor Appoying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUN,. L. REV. 656
(1974); Note, Shopping Centers and the Fourteenth .4mendment: Public Function and State Action,
33 U. PTrr. L. REv. 112 (1971).
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claims against private parties.' 6 That interpretation no longer prevails;
actions by private entities may satisfy the state action requirement,' 7
thereby subjecting those entities to fourteenth amendment restrictions.
The standard to determine satisfaction of the state action require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment has varied throughout the history of
cases involving competing claims of free speech and private property.'8
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner'9 the Supreme Court held that a privately
owned shopping center is not subject to fourteenth amendment restric-
tions because of its invitation to the public to enter for designated pur-
16. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (fourteenth amendment is a prohi-
bition against state laws and acts performed under state authority); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 638-39 (1882) (fourteenth amendment is not a "guaranty against the commission of
individual offences"); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879) (judicial selection of jurors is
ministerial function and done in the capacity of state agent; therefore, fourteenth amendment is
applicable); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (fourteenth amendment refers to state
actions exclusively); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (fourteenth amendment
"adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against another").
17. See cases cited note 18 infra. The Supreme Court in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946), discussed the fourteenth amendment's applicability to actions by private entities. "Owner-
ship does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Id. at 506.
18. As noted previously, courts originally held the fourteenth amendment inapplicable to
claims against private parties. See note 16 supra. Courts have since used various tests to deter-
mine whether the fourteenth amendment is applicable to private entities. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (mere showing that shopping center invites public to shop therein
does not satisfy state action requirement); Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc,,
391 U.S. 308 (1968) (shopping center held to be functional equivalent of public property; thus,
state action requirement met); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1965) ("[w]hen private indi-
viduals or groups are endowed by the state with powers or functions governmental in nature, they
become agencies or instrumentalities of the state and subject to its constitutional limitations.");
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (challenged action is not purely private
if state has become the equivalent of joint participant); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(company-owned town is equivalent of public property); Huff v. Notre Dame High School, 456 F.
Supp. 1145 (D. Conn. 1978) (recognized existence of three state action theories: (1) state action; (2)
state likeness; (3) state entanglement); State v. Martin, 35 Conn. Supp. 555, -, 398 A.2d 1197,
1201 (Super. Ct. 1978) ("Government or state action will not be found where government involve-
ment is insignificant."); State v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968) (per curiam) (shop-
ping center with many diverse business concerns is open to the public in general; thus, state action
requirement is met); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d
792 (1970) (where private property is the functional equivalent of a business district, state action
requirement is satisfied). For a discussion of the various tests used by the courts, see Heneley,
Property Rights and First Amendment Rights, Balance and Conflict, 62 A.B.A.J. 77 (1976).
19. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). For further discussion of this case, see Note,
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEo.
L.J. 1187 (1973); Note, First Amendment Rights vs. Private Property Rights-The Death of the
"Functional Equivalent", 27 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 219 (1972).
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poses.2" Lloyd indicated that claimants asserting first amendment
rights to petition must prove that the center is open to the public, that
the expressive activity is related directly to the purpose for which the
center operates,2' and that adequate alternative channels of communi-
cation do not exist.22
Rather than attempting to satisfy the rigorous Lloyd standard, appel-
lants in Robins circumvented the state action requirement by alleging
infringement of California constitutional rights.23 The California con-
stitution contains guarantees of free speech and expression similar to
first amendment rights, but it does not restrict application to state-in-
flicted deprivations.24
The California Supreme Court held that the state constitution's lib-
erty of speech provision guaranteed appellants' asserted rights to peti-
tion inside a private shopping center.25 The court overruled Diamond v.
Bland'-6 and found that California could provide greater protection of
free expression than the first and the fourteenth amendments guaran-
tee.27 The court noted that in interpreting the state's liberty of speech
20. 407 U.S. at 564-65, 570. The Court held that the invitation to enter was limited in scope.
It was not an invitation to exercise first amendment rights therein. Id. at 564-65.
21. Id. at 564. The Court distinguished Lloyd from Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). In Logan the Court held that a shopping center is the
functional equivalent of public property, and thus recognized the right of a union to picket a store
within a private center. Id. at 313-15. The Lloyd Court distinguished Logan in part by asserting
that the relationship of claimants' activity to the purpose for which the center operated was a
determinative factor in that case. 407 U.S. at 564.
22. "It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to
the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues
of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without signifi-
cantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech." 407 U.S. at 567.
23. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
24. The text of the applicable sections of the California constitution appears in note 3 supra.
25. 23 Cal. 3d at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
26. Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
885 (1974).
27. 23 Cal. 3d at 907-10, 592 P.2d at 346-47, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60. Relying on Wilson v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975), the court held that the
California constitutional guarantee of free speech is more definitive and inclusive than that of the
first amendment. Id. at 658, 532 P.2d at 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 472. For a discussion of the
California free speech provisions, see Note, Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26
HASTINos L.J. 481 (1974). Cf. Falk, Foreword to The Supreme Court of CaIfornia 1971-1972, The
State Constitution: 4 More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 284
(1973) ("the American constitutional system neither requires nor prefers that state judges conform
their interpretation of state constitutions to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the federal charter"); Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provision, "[flederal principles are relevant but not conclusive so long
as federal rights are protected."28
Appellee Pruneyard argued that a state-guaranteed right to petition
inside a private shopping center deprived the owners of property with-
out due process in violation of the fifth29 and the fourteenth3 0 amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.31 Appellee contended that
Lloyd recognized fifth and fourteenth amendment rights of shopping
centers to prevent use of their premises as a forum for public expres-
sion.32 Appellee further asserted that the principle of supremacy estab-
lished in the California 33 and federal34 constitutions precluded the
court from recognizing broader rights to petition inside a private center
VAND. L. REv. 620, 642 (1951) ("Although state constitutions contain full statements of our civil
liberties, on the whole the record of state court guardianship of 'First Amendment Freedoms' is
disappointing."). Contra, Lenrich Assocs. v. Heyda, 264 Or. 122, 504 P.2d 112 (1972) (state may
not recognize broader rights of free speech under Lloyd).
28. 23 Cal. 3d at 909, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859. The court found evidence in
prior decisions of the importance of free speech in California. d.; see, e.g., In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d
872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1967); Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionary Workers' Local 31, 61
Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964).
29. "Nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
30. "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fifth amendment restricts only actions of the federal govern-
ment, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), but the fourteenth amendment prohib-
its states from inflicting deprivations similar to those outlawed by the fifth amendment. See, e.g.,
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 410 (1905); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325
(1903). The word "person" in the fourteenth amendment includes corporations. Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory"of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1937-1938).
31. 23 Cal. 3d at 903-04, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
32. Id. The Lloyd Court addressed the need to accommodate interests protected by the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments. The Court concluded that in Lloyd the result of such an ac-
comodation was clear and that claimants were not entitled to exercise first amendment rights in
the center. "Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without significantly en-
hancing the asserted right of free speech." Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68, 570
(1972).
33. "The State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the
United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land." CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1.
34. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitutions of Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI., cl. 2.
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than rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.35
The court rejected appellee's due process and supremacy arguments,
finding that Lloyd did not recognize an impenetrable right of centers to
deny access to individuals seeking to exercise free speech rights. 36 The
court interpreted the refusal of the Lloyd Court to allow petitioning in
a private center as a result of claimants' inability to satisfy the four-
teenth amendment state action requirement, and not as a result of the
center's inpregnable rights.3 7  This interpretation of Lloyd circum-
vented appellee's supremacy clause argument, because California's ex-
panded protection of free expression did not conflict with either federal
law or the Constitution.38
The court justified its encroachment on the rights of private property
owners as a legitimate exercise of a state's power to regulate uses of
private property for the benefit of society.39 The court also based its
holding on the extreme importance of the right to petition under Cali-
fornia's governmental scheme,40 on the tremendous growth in the
number and popularity of private shopping centers,4 1 and on the poten-
35. 23 Cal. 3d at 903-04, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (federal constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme
law of the land; state laws must yield to conflicting federal edicts.).
36. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. Seegeneralv 86 HARV. L. REV.
1592 (1972).
37. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856. The court found support for this
interpretation of Lloyd in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), and in Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976).
38. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347. 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
39. Id. at 905-07, 592 P.2d at 344-45, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58. The court cited numerous
precedents to support this conclusion, including Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926) (state zoning power); Agriculture Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d
392, 546 P.2d 687, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P.
381 (1925). See Powell, The Relationship Between Proper/v Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 135 (1963). The court also supported its position by noting the power of a state to regulate
natural resources. 23 Cal. 3d at 906, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
40. 23 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345-46, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59. The right to petition is
especially important in California because it provides the process by which citizens bring about
change in government through initiative, referendum, and recall. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8.
41. 23 Cal. 3d at 907, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858. The court reviewed evidence
bhowing the tremendous growth of centers and the importance of private shopping centers as
public forums. Id See Note, The Public Forumfrom Marsh to Lloyd, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 159, 159-
6 1(1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Free Speech on Premises of Privately Owned Shopping Cen-
ters, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 612.
Modern day shopping centers perform the public function of providing society with
the necessities of life, and are not only the modern suburban counterpart of the town
business districts, but are also eliminating them. The result: suburban shopping centers
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tial impact of shopping centers as public forums.4 2
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center 3 continues a trend toward fur-
ther restrictions on private property ownership rights." Courts have
often balanced the competing interests of free expression and private
property.45 Changing social and economic conditions assure that if
courts continue to employ this balancing test both the right of free ex-
pression and property rights will remain in flux.4 6 Robins demonstrates
that state guarantees of free expression are expandable and that liti-
gants may possibly circumvent the state action requirement of the four-
teenth amendment by asserting claims under state constitutions.
LANDLORD & TENANT-RETALIATORY EVICTION-HAWAII REC-
OGNIZES COMMON-LAW RETALIATORY EVICTION DEFENSE SUPPLE-
MENTARY TO STATE STATUTE. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59
Hawaii 104, 577 P.2d 326 (1978). Windward Partners petitioned the
State Land Use .Commission to rezone its land from "agricultural" to
"urban" as a first step in a plan to develop the area into a residential
community.! Four residential and four nonresidential tenants who oc-
cupied the land attended a statutorily required public land-use hearing2
and vigorously opposed the rezoning. After the Commission denied
the petition, the landowners terminated the tenants' month-to-month
tenancies. When the tenants refused to vacate, the owners instituted
eviction proceedings. The trial court refused as a matter of law to al-
in the nation's 21 largest metropolitan areas account for 50 percent of the retail trade,
while the innercity downtowns are dying.
Id. at 618 (footnotes omitted).
42. 23 Cal. 3d at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345-46, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
43. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 419 (1979) (No.
79-289).
44. For an excellent discussion of the changing nature of property rights in the United States,
see Powell, supra note 39.
45. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The balancing test employed by the
courts appears in Heneley, supra note 18.
46. Agriculture Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 404, 546 P.2d 687,
694-95, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 190-91 (1976) (power of government to regulate uses of property must
be adaptable to changing environment).
1. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59 Hawaii 104, 577 P.2d 326 (1978).
2. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4(e) (1976).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/14
